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Abstract
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Introduction

In this paper, we study the ethics of resource allocation in a basic and common problem. There is a resource, available in given quantity, to be allocated
among individuals, each of whom possesses a capability to transform the resource into some given valued outcome, and the achievements of individuals,
with regard to that outcome, are interpersonally comparable. The data of
the problem are (N, (ui )i∈N , W ), where N is the group of individuals in the
population to be served, W ∈ R+ is the resource budget, and ui : R+ → R+

is the function which describes the capacity of individual i ∈ N to convert

the resource into the desired outcome.

In many resource allocation problems of this sort, there are two focal
points of distribution: to distribute the available resource equally among
all who need it, and to distribute the resource among the population so as
to equalize the outcomes among them. Often, however, the ‘equal-resource’
allocation seems too harsh: it does not take into account the diﬀerential
ability of individuals to convert the resource into the desired outcome. On
the other hand, often the equal-outcome allocation seems too extreme: it
may require giving the lion’s share of the resource to very ‘handicapped’
individuals, ones with poor outcome functions, and this may appear to be
unfair to those who are more fortunate. This is a familiar criticism of the
Rawlsian maximin allocation.
The philosopher Derek Parfit, partly as a reaction to the extremism of
Rawlsian maximin, coined the term ‘priority’ for the view that lies ‘in between’ the equal-resource and the equal-outcome view. He proposed that the
right view is to give priority to those who are less capable of transforming
resource into outcome. (Parfit did not work on a formal domain of problems,
so we are paraphrasing here.) We formalize Parfit’s view in the following
axiom:
Priority: Let xi denote the amount of resources allocated to individual i. If
xi < xj then ui (xi ) ≥ uj (xj ).
2

Priority says that no individual can dominate another in both resources
and outcomes. In particular, individuals with a worse capability of transforming resources into outcomes are allocated more resources, a desirable feature
according to Sen (1973). It is intuitively clear that priority admits a large
class of possible resource allocations —just think of the possible compromises
between the equal-resource and the equal-outcome allocation. Prioritarianism includes —it would seem as polar cases— those two allocations or allocation
rules.
There is a second principle that we believe characterizes fairness in many
problems, which we call solidarity. The idea is that, if an allocation rule is
fair, then when new individuals join a society (e.g., through birth or immigration) then the resources allocated to all the original members should change
in the same direction. Intuitively, if the new members bring with them a
lot of resources, then everyone in the original population should gain, and
if they bring with them few or no resources, then everyone in the original
population should chip in some resource to help them. We formalize this
axiom as follows:
0

Solidarity. Let N ⊆ N 0 . If x = (xi )i∈N and x0 = (xi )i∈N 0 = (xN , xN \N ) are
the allocation vectors for (N, (ui )i∈N , W ) and (N 0 , (ui )i∈N 0 , W 0 ) respectively,

then either x = xN , x > xN or x < xN .
The solidarity axiom has been used in diﬀerent forms by Thomson (1983),
Roemer (1986), Moulin (1987), Chun (1996), Sprumont (1996) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999), among others. This axiom implies the axiom of
consistency, an axiom that has received considerable attention in decision
problems and in the theory of distributive justice (see, for instance, Young,
1994; Roemer, 1996; Moulin, 2003; Thomson, 2004; and the literature cited
therein).
Finally, we believe that fairness requires impartiality. This means that
in deciding how to allocate the resource, we ignore all attributes of persons
that are irrelevant, according to our moral standard, to the problem at hand.
For instance, if the problem is one of allocating scarce rescuer time to saving
3

earthquake victims, we ignore the victim’s religion and race (though perhaps
not his age). In reality, impartiality is a very strong requirement. Suppose
the issue is to distribute educational resources to children, who have diﬀerent
capacities to transform them into future earning power. One might say that
impartiality requires that the allocation rule ignore the wealth of parents.
However, the allocation rule that allocates such resources in the United States
surely does not ignore parental wealth.
We state the impartiality axiom as:
Impartiality. Allocation rules are defined on economic environments (N, (ui )i∈N , W ).
Here are some examples where, we believe, the axioms of solidarity, priority and impartiality either apply in common practice, or, arguably, morality
suggests that they should apply:
1. The resource W is parental time allocated to children, and ui (xi ) is the
(predicted) success of child i if he receives parental time xi . Solidarity
says that when a new child arrives in the family, parental time to all
the other children changes in the same way (decreases, here); priority
says that, generally, a parent should devote more time to children who
are less able, but not to the extent of rendering those children more
successful than more able children.
2. Distribution of a parent’s estate among children. The same ideas apply
as in #1. Here, equal division of the estate is commonly done, which
is consistent with solidarity and priority.
3. The resource W is the budget of educational finance; ui (xi ) is, perhaps,
the predicted future wage of a child of type i if she receives xi in educational finance. Priority says that we should devote at least as much
educational resource to children who have inferior abilities to transform
the resource into future earning power.
4. The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to spend extra
resources to enable disabled workers to perform adequately on the job.
4

Here, ui (xi ) might be the degree of success on the job.
The reader can doubtless supply many more examples.
An example that does not satisfy priority is triage on the battlefield. The
resource is physician time; ui (xi ) is the probability of survival of wounded
soldier i. The army’s goal is to maximize the number of soldiers who survive,
and can return to battle; it will devote no resources to badly wounded soldiers
for whom the function ui is very poor. Note that fairness is not the issue
here, but maximizing the eﬀectiveness of the army.
Consider, however, the victims of an earthquake, where the resource is
scarce rescuer time. ui is the probability-of-survival function for person i
where the argument is rescuer time devoted to saving i. Should the allocation
of rescuer time satisfy priority, or is this a case like triage? It depends whether
our objective is fairness towards individuals or to maximize the number of
people saved. If it is fairness, then priority applies. It is intuitively clear
that the most ‘conservative’ prioritarian practice would be to give all victims
equal time; the most ‘radical’ would be to allocate the time among victims
so that all have an equal probability of survival. Priority says that in no case
do we allocate so much rescuer time to a more badly trapped victim that we
increase his survival probability above the survival probability of a less badly
trapped victim.
In this paper, we characterize, on a domain of possible problems, the set of
allocation rules that jointly satisfy priority, solidarity, and impartiality. The
intuitions that we have hinted at are verified: there is a large class of such
rules, and the equal-resource and equal-outcome rules are polar cases in that
class, on the ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ ends. The admissible class turns out
to involve indices of resources and outcomes. To be precise, we will show that
the three axioms require us to equalize some index of resources and outcomes,
at the highest possible level. In particular, these rules pay equal attention to
resources and outcomes in an explicit way; they are not ‘welfarist’ rules that
consider only the pattern of outcomes that resource allocations generate. As
such, this work is a contribution to non-welfarist social-choice theory. Indeed,
5

the non-welfarist aspect of our approach is evident in the priority axiom: for
that axiom implements a special moral concern for the amount of resource
that a person receives. (That claim is vague, but we hope the reader agrees
with us.)
Using indices of resources and outcomes to measure the success of an
allocation procedure is a fairly common practice. The UNDP’s human development indicator is an index of a country’s GDP, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate. John Rawls (1971) worked, famously, with an index of
primary goods: some of those ‘good’ were resources, and some ‘outcomes.’
Amartya Sen (1980, 1992) has written of using an index of functionings as
a possible measure of a person’s welfare. In these examples, the social welfare supremum is thought to be the allocation of resources that equalizes the
index in question, at the highest possible level. This is our characterization
theorem.
In part one of the duo of papers of which this is second, we explored
what is perhaps the most famous approach to implementing impartiality in
ethics, the veil of ignorance. Our study led us to the view that that approach
violated prioritarianism, which we take to be an ethical requirement. This
paper continues that research program, in asking what allocation rules do
satisfy prioritarianism and impartiality —and another axiom that we consider
to be ethically desirable, solidarity. Further comments will follow in our
conclusion.
From the viewpoint of ethics, the priority axiom implements Parfit’s attempt to find a compromise between ignoring capabilities of persons, in the
assignment of resources, and going (what some consider to be) overboard
with regard to achieving outcome equality. As such, our characterization
theorem tells us what the ethics of compromise, so viewed, require.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
axiomatic theory of resource allocation involving the concepts of impartiality,
solidarity, and priority. In Section 3 we characterize the family of rules
satisfying these three notions and in Section 4 we focus on two important
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rules within the family: the equal-resource rule and the equal-welfare rule.
Section 5 concludes. Most of the proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.

2

The model

Let N = {1, 2, 3, ...} represent a population of all potential individuals and

let N be a collection of finite subsets of N. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} ∈ N be a

set of individuals with generic elements i and j. Individuals derive welfare
from a resource, called wealth. We assume that N × R+ is endowed with
a complete order. The expression (i, W ) % (j, W 0 ) is read: “individual i

equipped with wealth W enjoys a welfare level at least as high as individual
j equipped with wealth W 0 ”. We assume that this order is continuous in W ,
and satisfies that, for any i, j ∈ N and W ∈ R+ there is a wealth level W 0

such that (i, W ) ∼ (j, W 0 ). We further assume that for any pair i, j ∈ N,

(i, 0) ∼ (j, 0). A wealth level of zero can be thought of as inducing death,

which is an equally bad outcome for all individuals. Finally, we assume that
welfare is strictly increasing in wealth for every individual.
It is convenient to represent this interpersonally level comparable welfare
ordering as follows. Fix a particular individual and call her individual 0.
For any other individual i define a function ui : R+ → R+ where for each
W ∈ R+ , ui (W ) is such that

(0, ui (W )) ∼ (i, W )
In other words, ui (W ) is the wealth that 0 must receive in order that she
enjoy the same level of welfare as individual i enjoys with wealth W .1 We
say that an individual is more able than another one if the former needs less
wealth than the latter one to reach the same level of welfare. Formally,
An individual i is able with respect to an individual j if ui ≥ uj and ui 6=

uj . We also say that, in this case, individual j is disabled with respect to
individual i.
1

In particular, u0 is the identity function.
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Two individuals are comparable if one is at least as able as the other.
Obviously, there might be individuals who are not comparable.
The assumptions on % tell us that for all i, ui is a continuous strictly
increasing unbounded function satisfying that ui (0) = 0.2 We say that a
family of functions constitutes a dense domain if the graphs of these functions
cover the positive quadrant. We shall assume that {ui : i ∈ N} constitutes a
dense domain. Formally,

Dense Domain. {ui : i ∈ N} is a dense domain, i.e., for every (a, b) ∈ R2++

there exists an individual i ∈ N such that ui (a) = b.

We define an economy e as a triple (N, u, W ), where N ∈ N is the

set of individuals, u = (ui )i∈N is the profile of utility functions (defined as
above) for individuals in N, and W ∈ R+ represents the available wealth.

The family of all economies is E.

2.1

Allocation rules

An allocation rule is a function F that associates to each economy e =
P
(N, u, W ) ∈ E a unique point F (e) = (Fi (e))i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that i∈N Fi (e) =

W . That is, an allocation rule indicates how to distribute the wealth available
in an economy among its members.
Examples of rules are the following: First, the rules that assign all the
available wealth to a unique individual in the economy.
(
W if i = j,
Dictatorial rule ( Dj ): Dij (N, u, W ) =
.
0
otherwise.
Next, the rule that awards each agent the same amount:
Equal-Resource rule ( ER): ERi (N, u, W ) =

W
.
n

An alternative to the equal-resource rule is obtained by focusing on the
welfare levels individuals achieve, as opposed to what resources they receive,
and choosing the vector at which these welfare levels are equal.
2

Note that the functions ui comprise a profile of utility functions for individuals which

measure utility in a level comparable way.
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Equal-Welfare rule ( EW ): EWi (N, u, W ) = u−1
i (λ), where λ > 0 is choP
−1
sen so that i∈N ui (λ) = W .

Note that, for all i ∈ I, u−1
i is a continuous strictly increasing unbounded

function satisfying that u−1
i (0) = 0. From here, it follows that EW is welldefined.

Another possibility is to combine these rules depending on the cardinality
of the set of individuals. For instance,
(
EW (N, u, W ) if n = 2,
Mixed rule ( M): M(N, u, W ) =
ER(N, u, W ) otherwise.
Finally, one could also implement the idea of proportionality to construct
an allocation rule. For instance,
Proportional rule ( P ): P (N, u, W ) = λ · (u−1
i (1))i∈N , where λ > 0 is
P
−1
W
chosen so that i∈N ui (1) = λ .

2.2

Axioms

We now present the axioms we want rules to satisfy. These axioms will reflect
the three notions discussed above: impartiality, priority and solidarity.
First, it is worth mentioning that by defining rules on the class of economies
E we are excluding much information about persons that we consider ethically irrelevant. In doing so, we are implicitly modeling impartiality.

We now turn to priority. Our axiom of priority says that no agent can
dominate another agent both in resources and welfare.
Priority (PR) Let e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ N such that Fi (e) < Fj (e).
Then ui (Fi (e)) ≥ uj (Fj (e)).

Note that this axiom guarantees that disabled agents receive at least as
much wealth as abler ones: we discriminate positively towards the disabled.
In other words, priority implies the weak equity axiom introduced by Sen
(1973). On the other hand, the axiom also says that the obligation towards
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the unfortunate is limited, as a disabled person is never resourced to the extent that her welfare exceeds that of an able agent. It is also straightforward
to show that priority implies a weak version of anonymity which says that
individuals that are equally able are rewarded equally.
We conclude with solidarity. Here we rely upon a literature which has
formulated various solidarity axioms in the past twenty years. Alternative
versions of solidarity have been considered in diﬀerent contexts like fair division (e.g., Thomson, 1983; Roemer, 1986), social choice (e.g., Chun, 1986),
compensation problems (e.g., Moulin, 1987; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999),
bankruptcy problems (e.g., Chun, 1989), surplus-sharing (e.g., Keiding and
Moulin, 1991), collective choice (e.g., Sprumont, 1996; Ehlers and Klaus,
2001), or house allocation (e.g., Ehlers and Klaus, 2004). Our notion of solidarity says that the arrival of immigrants, whether or not accompanied by
changes in the available wealth, should aﬀect all original agents in the same
direction: all gain or all lose, or all receive the same as before.
Solidarity (SL). Let e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E and e0 = (N 0 , u0 , W 0 ) ∈ E, such that

N 0 ⊆ N. Let FN 0 (e) denote the projection of F (e) onto the set of coordinates
corresponding to N 0 . Then either F (e0 ) = FN 0 (e), F (e0 ) > FN 0 (e) or F (e0 ) <
FN 0 (e).3
Note that solidarity implies that when a bad or good shock comes to
an economy, all its members should share in the calamity or windfall. This
property is usually known as resource monotonicity (e.g., Roemer, 1986). It
is also straightforward to show that solidarity implies consistency, a property
that says that if a sub-group of individuals secedes with the resource allocated
to it under a rule, then in the smaller economy the rule allocates the resource
in the same way. The reader is referred to Young (1994), Roemer (1996) or
Thomson (2004) for the many applications that exist in the literature on
distributive justice concerning this notion.
3

Note that for x = (x1 , ..., xn ) ∈ Rn and y = (y1 , ..., yn ) ∈ Rn , we write x > y if xi > yi

for all i = 1, ..., n.
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3

A characterization result

Among the rules introduced in Section 2.1 only the equal-resource and the
equal-welfare rules satisfy solidarity and priority. The purpose of this section
is to identify all the remaining existing rules satisfying these properties.
Let Φ be the class of functions composed of all functions ϕ : R2++ ∪

{(0, 0)} → R+ , continuous on its domain and non-decreasing, such that

inf{ϕ(x, y)} = ϕ(0, 0) = 0 and for all (x, y) > (z, t), ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(z, t). Let ϕ
be a function in the class Φ. For all i ∈ N define the function ψ i : R+ → R+

that determines the ϕ−value agent i achieves, depending on the wealth she

receives, i.e., ψi (w) = ϕ(w, ui (w)) for all w ∈ R+ . Then, we define the
corresponding index-egalitarian rule as the rule that equalizes the ϕ value

across individuals in an economy.
Index-egalitarian rule ( E ϕ ): Eiϕ (e) = ψ−1
i (λ), where λ > 0 is chosen so
P
that i∈N ψ−1
i (λ) = W .
Note that, for all i ∈ I, ψ−1
i is a continuous strictly increasing unbounded

ϕ
function satisfying that ψ−1
i (0) = 0. From here, it follows that E is well

defined. Note also that applied in this manner to an agent’s wealth and
welfare, ϕ can be considered to be a generalized index of wealth and welfare.
So the rules just defined equalize a generalized index of wealth and welfare.4
All the rules within the family {E ϕ }ϕ∈Φ satisfy solidarity and priority.

More remarkably, there is no other rule satisfying these two properties simultaneously, as the next result shows.
Theorem 1 A rule F satisfies solidarity and priority if and only if F ∈
{E ϕ }ϕ∈Φ .

Theorem 1 shows that impartiality, solidarity and priority are equivalent
to a kind of egalitarianism, where the equality in question is equality of a
conception of well-being that is some general index of welfare and resources.
In particular, prioritarianism, at least in conjunction with solidarity, does
4

We are indebted in a major way to Klaus Nehring, who suggested the Eϕ rules.
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not preclude equality, but it modifies the equalisandum from ‘welfare’ to an
index of welfare and resources.
Proof of Theorem 1.
It is easy to show that all the E ϕ rules satisfy SL and P R. Conversely,
let F be a rule that satisfies SL and P R. We show that there exists ϕ ∈ Φ

such that F = E ϕ . First, a preliminary lemma.

Lemma 1 For i, j ∈ N and α > 0 fixed, there exists W ∈ R+ such that

Fi ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ) = α.

We now introduce some notation. Let i ∈ N be given and α ∈ R+ .

Let E(F, i, α) be the domain of economies for which individual i obtains an
amount of wealth α, under rule F . Formally:
E(F, i, α) = {e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E : Fi (e) = α}.
Let C(F, i, α) be the set of points in the plane which are achieved as wealthwelfare ordered pairs under the action of F on individuals who are members
of economies in E(F, i, α). Formally:
C(F, i, α) = {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : ∃e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E(F, i, α), j ∈ N s.t. (a, b) = (Fj (e), uj (Fj (e)))}.
Our aim is to show that the family of curves {C(F, i, α) : α ∈ R+ } is the

isoquant map of an appropriate function ϕ ∈ Φ and therefore to show that

F = E ϕ.

Lemma 2 If α1 6= α2 then C(F, i, α1 ) ∩ C(F, i, α2 ) = ∅.
Let (a, b) ∈ R2+ be given. By the assumption of dense domain, and

Lemma 1, there exists α ∈ R+ such that (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α). By Lemma 2, α

is unique. Define then the function ϕ : R2++ ∪ {(0, 0)} → R+ by ϕ(a, b) = α,
where α ∈ R+ is the unique number for which (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α). Then,

Lemma 3 Let ϕ defined as above. Then, ϕ ∈ Φ.
12

We show now that F = E ϕ , i.e., F (N, u, W ) = E ϕ (N, u, W ) for all
(N, u, W ) ∈ E. Fix e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E. Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1: i ∈ N.

Let λ = Fi (e). Then, (Fj (e), uj (Fj (e))) ∈ C(F, i, λ) for all j ∈ N. By

definition of ϕ, ϕ(Fj (e), uj (Fj (e))) = λ, for all j ∈ N. Thus, ψj (Fj (e)) = λ
P
for all j ∈ N. Since j∈N Fj (e) = W , it follows that F (e) = E ϕ (e).
Case 2: i ∈
/ N.

Pick two agents j, k ∈ N \ {i}. Let wj = Fj (e) and wk = Fk (e).
c) and e
By Lemma 1, there are two economies eb = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W
e =
f) such that wj = Fj (b
({i, k}, (ui , uk ), W
e) and wk = Fk (e
e); let w
bi = Fi (b
e)

and w
ei = Fi (e
e).

bi ) and C(F, k, wk ) = C(F, i, w
ei ).
Claim. C(F, j, wj ) = C(F, i, w

bi ). The
Proof of the claim. We only show that C(F, j, wj ) = C(F, i, w
proof of C(F, k, wk ) = C(F, i, w
ei ) is identical.

Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, w
bi ). Then, there exists l ∈ N such that b = ul (a) and

(w
bi , a) = (Fi (e2 ), Fl (e2 )), where e2 = ({i, l}, (ui , ul ), w
bi + a). By a similar

argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W 3 such that Fi (e3 ) = w
bi , where
e3 = ({i, j, l}, (ui , uj , ul ), W 3 ). Then, eb, e2 and e3 belong to E(F, i, w
bi ). Thus,

by SL, a = Fl (e2 ) = Fl (e3 ) and wj = Fj (b
e) = Fj (e3 ). Consequently, e3 ∈

E(F, j, wj ) and (a, b) ∈ C(F, j, wj ), showing that C(F, i, w
bi ) ⊆ C(F, j, wj ).

Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, j, wj ). Then, there exists l ∈ N such that b = ul (a) and

(wj , a) = (Fj (e2 ), Fl (e2 )), where e2 = ({j, l}, (ui , ul ), wj + a). By a similar

argument to that of Lemma 1, there exists W 3 such that Fj (e3 ) = wj , where
e3 = ({i, j, l}, (ui , uj , ul ), W 3 ). Then, eb, e2 and e3 belong to E(F, j, wj ). Thus,

by SL, a = Fl (e2 ) = Fl (e3 ) and w
bi = Fi (b
e) = Fi (e3 ). Consequently, e3 ∈

E(F, i, w
bi ) and (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, w
bi ), showing that C(F, i, w
bi ) ⊇ C(F, j, wj ).

This proves the claim.

Note that (wj , uj (wj )) ∈ C(F, j, wj ) ∩ C(F, k, wk ). Since C(F, j, wj ) =

C(F, i, w
bi ) and C(F, k, wk ) = C(F, i, w
ei ), then

(wj , uj (wj )) ∈ C(F, i, w
bi ) ∩ C(F, i, w
ei ).
13

By Lemma 2, it follows that w
bi = w
ei = wi . Thus, C(F, j, wj ) = C(F, i, wi ) =

C(F, k, wk ). Therefore all the points {(Fl (e), ul (Fl (e))) : l ∈ N} lie on the

wi -isoquant of ϕ, and it follows, as in Case 1, that F coincides with E ϕ on

the entire domain E.
The reader might note that although we chose a specific profile of utility functions to represent the interpersonal ordering %, the class of rules
characterized in Theorem 1 is independent of this choice.
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Two important allocation rules

In this section we focus upon two rules within the family of {E ϕ }ϕ∈Φ rules.

The equal-resource (ER) rule is the E ϕ1 rule, where ϕ1 (x, y) = x. The
equal-welfare (EW ) rule is the E ϕ2 rule, where ϕ2 (x, y) = y. The ER rule
equalizes the wealth of individuals in all economies, whereas the EW rule
equalizes the welfare of individuals in all economies. These two rules are the
extreme prioritarian rules for the most able and the least able agents in an
economy. More precisely, ER is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for the
ablest (disablest) agent, whereas EW is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for
the disablest (ablest) agent.
Proposition 1 Let e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E. Let i (j) be the ablest (disablest)

individual in N. Then, for all rules F satisfying priority, we have:
(i) ERi (e) ≥ Fi (e) ≥ EWi (e)

(ii) ERj (e) ≤ Fj (e) ≤ EWj (e)

Proof.
Let F be a rule satisfying P R. Let e = (N, u, W ) ∈ E and let i (j) be

the ablest (disablest) individual in N. We shall show (i). The proof of (ii) is
analogous.

Suppose, contrary to the claim, that ERi (e) < Fi (e). Then, there exists
k ∈ N such that ERk (e) > Fk (e). Since ERk (e) = ERi (e), it follows that

Fi (e) > Fk (e). Then, by P R, ui (Fi (e)) ≤ uk (Fk (e)). On the other hand,
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since i is the ablest individual in N, it follows that ui ≥ uk . Thus, by

monotonicity, ui (Fi (e)) > ui (Fk (e)) ≥ uk (Fk (e)), which is a contradiction.

Similarly, if Fi (e) < EWi (e), there exists k ∈ N such that EWk (e) <

Fk (e). Since ui and uk are strictly increasing, it follows that ui (Fi (e)) <
ui (EWi (e)) = uk (EWk (e)) < uk (Fk (e)). Thus, by P R, Fi (e) ≥ Fk (e). Now,
since ui ≥ uk , it follows, by monotonicity, that ui (Fi (e)) ≥ ui (Fk (e)) ≥

uk (Fk (e)), which is a contradiction.

In particular, Proposition 1 shows that, for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
ERi (e) ≥ Eiϕ (e) ≥ EWi (e) and ERj (e) ≤ Ejϕ (e) ≤ EWj (e),
where i and j are, respectively, the ablest and disablest individuals in e.
We can define a duality relationship between the members of the {E ϕ }ϕ∈Φ

family as follows. For each ϕ ∈ Φ, let ϕ∗ be defined as ϕ∗ (x, y) = ϕ(y, x).
∗

∗

Then, ϕ∗ ∈ Φ. We define the dual rule of E ϕ as E ϕ . E ϕ and E ϕ are

symmetric with respect to the treatment of wealth and welfare. Note that
ER and EW are dual rules.

5

Recapitulation

We have presented a characterization, in simple environments, of allocation
rules that satisfy impartiality, solidarity and priority. In particular, our result
resolves the tension that exists between impartiality and priority, that we
highlighted in part one of the duo of papers of which this is the second, when
one uses the veil of ignorance as the tool to enforce impartiality. Indeed,
we get something more: impartiality and priority, together with solidarity,
imply a kind of egalitarianism, where the index of wealth and welfare that is
equalized according to justice is not determined without further assumptions.
Two classical distribution rules are polar (and even ‘dual’) in the class of
index-egalitarian rules —the equal-resource and equal-welfare allocation rules.
To characterize the family of ‘index-egalitarian’ rules, we had to use not
only impartiality and priority, but something more, solidarity. This may be
15

a disappointment to political philosophers often called ‘left-liberal’, a class
which includes such writers as John Rawls (1971), Brian Barry (1995), and
perhaps Thomas Scanlon (1998). For it has been a goal of that school to deduce egalitarianism from axioms which would attract almost universal assent
—like impartiality and perhaps priority. The title of Barry’s book, Justice as
Impartiality, even suggests that impartiality alone implies something close to
egalitarianism, as that is the kind of justice that he describes therein. The
solidarity axiom, which we have needed for our characterization, seems to be
itself quite radical, in that it insists upon a strong kind of cooperation among
citizens. We have therefore not derived equality from axioms which would
attract almost universal assent.
We conclude with some remarks linking this paper with Part 1, in which
we showed that the veil of ignorance, viewed as an allocation rule, was nonprioritarian. Strictly speaking, the present paper is incomparable to that
one, because the domains of the resource-allocation rules are diﬀerent. In
Part 1, we included the risk preferences of the individuals as information in
the problem, as well as the level of resource and the interpersonal welfare
ordering. We would have liked to have characterized our index-egalitarian
rules on that domain, but that would be a much more diﬃcult task.
Regarding priority: What we, the ethical observers, consider a bad outcome —having a society in which the disabled are less abundantly resourced
than the able— does not coincide with the bad outcome to the individual
behind the veil of ignorance who faces the birth lottery; the worst outcome
for her may be being born able without suﬃcient resources to fully exploit
that ability. This is, of course, why the veil sometimes (often) allocates less
wealth to the disabled than to the able, as we showed in Part 1. We have
not defended our axiom of priority: it is, after all, an axiom. To do so would
require a fully philosophical inquiry.

Appendix: Proofs of the lemmata
We assume throughout this appendix that F is an allocation rule satis16

fying SL and P R.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let i, j ∈ N and α > 0 be given and denote e = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ) for

each W > 0. Since Fi (e) ≤ W , it follows that, for W suﬃciently small,
Fi (e) < α.

Suppose that Fi (e) < α for all e. Then, Fj (e) > W − α for all e and

therefore limW →∞ Fj (e) = ∞. In particular, for all e such that W > 2α,

Fj (e) > α > Fi (e). Thus, by P R, ui (Fi (e)) ≥ uj (Fj (e)). Since ui is increas-

ing, ui (α) ≥ uj (Fj (e)) for all e such that W > 2α. However, since uj is
unbounded, limW →∞ uj (Fj (e)) = ∞, a contradiction.

Thus, there exist W1 and W2 such that Fi (e1 ) < α and Fi (e2 ) > α
for e1 = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W1 ) and e2 = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W2 ). Consider the
following two sets:
Ω< = {W ∈ (0, +∞) : Fi (e) < α} and Ω> = {W ∈ (0, +∞) : Fi (e) > α}.
Then, W1 ∈ Ω< and W2 ∈ Ω> . Thus,
Ω< 6= ∅ and Ω> 6= ∅.

(1)

Furthermore, it is obvious that
Ω< ∩ Ω> = ∅.

(2)

Ω< and Ω> are open sets.

(3)

We show now that

Claim. Ω< and Ω> are open sets.
Proof of the claim. Let W ∈ Ω< and α = Fi (e) < α. Let ε =
<

α−α
.
2

We

<

show that (W − ε, W + ε) ⊂ Ω . By SL, (W − ε, W ) ⊂ Ω . Suppose, by

contradiction, that there exists W ∗ ∈ (W, W + ε) such that W ∗ ∈
/ Ω< , i.e.,
Fi (e∗ ) ≥ α, for e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ∗ ). By SL, Fj (e∗ ) > Fj (e) = W − α.

Then, W ∗ = Fj (e∗ ) + Fi (e∗ ) > W − α + α = W + 2ε, which contradicts that

W ∗ ∈ (W, W + ε). This shows that Ω< is an open set.
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Let W ∈ Ω> and α = Fi (e) > α. Let ε =
>

>

α−α
.
2

We show that (W −

ε, W + ε) ⊂ Ω . By SL, (W, W + ε) ⊂ Ω . Suppose, by contradiction,

that there exists W ∗ ∈ (W − ε, W ) such that W ∗ ∈
/ Ω> , i.e., Fi (e∗ ) ≤ α,

for e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ∗ ). By SL, Fj (e∗ ) < Fj (e) = W − α. Then,

W ∗ = Fj (e∗ ) + Fi (e∗ ) < W − α + α = W − 2ε, which contradicts that

W ∗ ∈ (W − ε, W ). This shows that Ω> is an open set, which proves the

claim.

Now, if, contrary to the statement, Fi (e) 6= α, for all W ∈ R++ , then
R++ ⊂ Ω> ∪ Ω< .

(4)

Finally, (1), (2), (3) and (4) together say that (0, +∞) is not connected,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2
We show first that any C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, i.e., if (a, b),
(a0 , b0 ) ∈ C(F, i, α) and a0 > a then b0 ≤ b. Suppose, to the contrary, that
b0 > b. By definition, there exist e = (N, u, W ) and e0 = (N 0 , u0 , W 0 ) ∈

E(F, i, α) and j ∈ N, k ∈ N 0 such that (a, b) = (Fj (e), uj (Fj (e))), (a0 , b0 ) =

(Fk (e0 ), uk (Fk (e0 ))). As well, there is a wealth W ∗ such that e∗ = ({i, j, k}, (ui , uj , uk ), W ∗ ) ∈

E(F, i, α) (same argument as Lemma 1). By SL, we know that Fj (e∗ ) = a,
Fk (e∗ ) = a0 and so Fj (e∗ ) < Fk (e∗ ). Thus, by P R, uj (Fj (e∗ )) ≥ uk (Fk (e∗ )).

However, we also know that, by hypothesis, b = uj (Fj (e∗ )) < uk (Fk (e∗ )) = b0 ,
a contradiction.
We show now that {C(F, i, α) : α ∈ R+ } is a collection of disjoint sets. Let

α1 > α2 . Suppose (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1 ) ∩ C(F, i, α2 ). Let e1 = (N1 , u1 , α1 ) ∈

E(F, i, α1 ), e2 = (N2 , u2 , α2 ) ∈ E(F, i, α2 ) and j ∈ N1 , k ∈ N2 such that

(a, b) = (Fj (e1 ), uj (Fj (e1 ))) = (Fk (e2 ), uk (Fk (e2 ))). Consider the economies
e1 = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), a + α1 ) and eb2 = ({i, k}, (ui , uk ), a + α2 ). SL implies
b

that Fi (b
e1 ) = α1 and Fi (b
e2 ) = α2 . By a similar argument to that of Lemma
1, there is a W > a + α2 such that ee2 = ({i, k}, (ui , uk ), W ) ∈ E(F, i, α1 ).

By SL, applied to eb2 and ee2 we know that Fk (e
e2 ) > Fk (b
e2 ) = a. Therefore,
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(a, b) < (Fk (e
e2 ), uk (Fk (e
e2 ))) ∈ C(F, i, α1 ). This contradicts the fact that

C(F, i, α1 ) is downward sloping.

We need additional machinery to prove Lemma 3.
Of two sets A and B in the plane we say that B lies above A if
1. For all (a1 , a2 ) ∈ A there exists (b1 , b2 ) ∈ B such that (a1 , a2 ) < (b1 , b2 ).
2. There is no (a1 , a2 ) ∈ A and (b1 , b2 ) ∈ B such that (b1 , b2 ) < (a1 , a2 ).
Clearly, if B lies above A, then A does not lie above B.
Claim. If α1 > α2 then C(F, i, α1 ) lies above C(F, i, α2 ).
Proof of the claim. Let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α2 ), and let e = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ) ∈
E(F, i, α2 ) such that Fj (e) = a, uj (Fj (e)) = b. Since Fi (e) = α2 , and by a

similar argument to that of the proof of 1, increasing the wealth from its value
in e, we eventually find a wealth value W ∗ such that e∗ = ({i, j}, (ui , uj ), W ∗ ) ∈

E(F, i, α1 ). Let (a0 , b0 ) = (Fj (e∗ ), uj (Fj (e∗ ))). Then, (a0 , b0 ) ∈ C(F, i, α1 ).

Furthermore, since F satisfies SL and uj is strictly increasing, (a0 , b0 ) > (a, b).
Conversely, let (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1 ). Suppose there were a point (a00 , b00 ) ∈

C(F, i, α2 ) such that (a00 , b00 ) > (a, b). We know that there is a point (α1 , d1 )

in C(F, i, α1 )—because (Fi (e), ui (Fi (e))) = (α1 , d1 ) for any e in E(F, i, α1 )—
and in like manner there is a point (α2 , d2 ) ∈ C(F, i, α2 ), and d1 = ui (α1 ) >

ui (α2 ) = d2 (because both points are associated with agent i). Thus we have
C(F, i, α1 ) Ä (α1 , d1 ) > (α2 , d2 ) ∈ C(F, i, α2 ),

C(F, i, α2 ) Ä (a00 , b00 ) > (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α1 )

(5)

Without loss of generality, assume that α2 < a00 . Then, it follows that
α2 < α1 < a < a00 .5
Let Λ(C(F, i, α)) be the support of the curve C(F, i, α), i.e., the wealth
values for which there exist welfare levels such that the pairs are achieved
under the action of F . Formally:
Λ(C(F, i, α)) = {a ∈ R+ : ∃ b ∈ R+ s.t. (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α)}.
5

If α2 > a00 , then a < a00 < α2 < α1 , and the ensuing argument would be analogous.
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Similarly, let Γ(C(F, i, α)) be the range of the curve C(F, i, α), i.e., the
welfare levels for which there exist wealth values such that the pairs are
achieved under the action of F . Formally,
Γ(C(F, i, α)) = {b ∈ R+ : ∃ a ∈ R+ s.t. (a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α)}.
For k = 1, 2, let γ k : Λ(C(F, i, αk )) → R+ be the mapping whose graph

coincides with the curve C(F, i, α), i.e., Gr(γ) = C(F, i, α).6 Then, by (5)
and the fact that C(F, i, αk ) are downward sloping, we have
max{γ 2 (α1 )} ≤ min{γ 2 (α2 )} ≤ max{γ 2 (α2 )} < min{γ 1 (α1 )} and
min{γ 2 (a)} ≥ max{γ 2 (a00 )} ≥ min{γ 2 (a00 )} > max{γ 1 (a)}.

(6)

Assume we know that all C(F, i, α) sets are connected. Then, both
Gr(γ 1 ) = C(F, i, α1 ) and Gr(γ 2 ) = C(F, i, α2 ) are connected sets. So are
their supports and therefore
(α1 , a) ⊂ Λ(C(F, i, α1 )) ∩ Λ(C(F, i, α2 )).
Since max{γ 2 (α1 )} < min{γ 1 (α1 )} and min{γ 2 (a)} > max{γ 1 (a)}, it follows
that there exists x ∈ (α1 , a) such that γ 1 (x) ∩ γ 2 (x) 6= ∅, which means that
C(F, i, α1 ) ∩ C(F, i, α2 ) 6= ∅. This contradicts Lemma 2.

Thus, it just remains to show that a C(F, i, α) set is connected. Since
C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, it follows that if it is not connected then
either Λ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected or Γ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Case 1: Λ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Let a, b ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) such that a < b and λ·a+(1−λ)b ∈
/ Λ(C(F, i, α))

for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, it follows that
b ∈ (0, 1) and let x
b · a + (1 − λ)b.
b Consider
min{γ(a)} ≥ max{γ(b)}. Fix λ
b=λ

θ=

min{γ(a)}
x

and let uj (x) = θ · x, for all x ∈ R+ . Then,
max{γ(b)} ≤ uj (b
x) = min{γ(a)}.

6

Note that γ may well be a multi-valued function.
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We know, by Lemma 1, that there exists w ∈ R+ such that (w, uj (w)) ∈
C(F, i, α). Thus, uj (w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.

Now, since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, we have that
y < uj (b
x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x > b,

and
y > uj (b
x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x < a.
Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj (x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction.
Case 2: Γ(C(F, i, α)) is not connected.
Let a, b ∈ Γ(C(F, i, α)) such that a < b and λ · a + (1 − λ)b ∈
/ Γ(C(F, i, α))

for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Assume there exists x such that {a, b} ⊂ γ(x).7 Fix
b
b
λ)b
b ∈ (0, 1) and let θ = λ·a+(1−
λ
. Consider uj (x) = θ · x, for all x ∈ R+ .
x
b
b We know, by Lemma 1, that there
Then, uj ∈ U and uj (b
x) = λ · a + (1 − λ)b.

exists w ∈ R+ such that (w, uj (w)) ∈ C(F, i, α). Thus, uj (w) ∩ γ(w) 6= ∅.
Now, since C(F, i, α) is downward sloping, it follows that

and

y < uj (b
x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x > x
b,
y > uj (b
x) for all y ∈ γ(x) such that x ∈ Λ(C(F, i, α)) and x < x
b.

Since uj is strictly increasing, it follows that uj (x) and γ(x) do not cross,
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the claim.
Proof of Lemma 3
Since F satisfies P R, it is straightforward to show that ϕ(0, 0) = 0 and
ϕ(x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ .
ϕ(0, 0) = 0 ≤ ϕ(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ .
7

(7)

If this were not the case, then Λ(C(F, i, α)) would not be connected, and the proof of

Case 1 would be valid to conclude.
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Let x, x0 , y ∈ R++ such that x < x0 . If ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(x0 , y) then, by

the above claim, C(F, i, ϕ(x, y)) lies above C(F, i, ϕ(x0 , y)). In such a case,

since (x0 , y) ∈ C(F, i, ϕ(x0 , y)), there exists (z, t) ∈ C(F, i, ϕ(x, y)) such that

(x0 , y) < (z, t). Then, (z, t) > (x, y). This contradicts Lemma 2. Thus,
ϕ(x, y) ≤ ϕ(x0 , y) for all x, x0 , y ∈ R++ such that x < x0 .

(8)

ϕ(x, y) ≤ ϕ(x0 , y) for all x, x0 , y ∈ R++ such that y < y 0 .

(9)

Similarly,

Finally, let (x, y), (z, t) ∈ R2+ such that (x, y) > (z, t). By downward

sloppiness, ϕ(x, y) 6= ϕ(z, t). If ϕ(x, y) < ϕ(z, t) then, by the above claim,

C(F, i, ϕ(z, t)) lies above C(F, i, ϕ(x, y)). We have, however, that (x, y) ∈

C(F, i, ϕ(x, y)), (z, t) ∈ C(F, i, ϕ(z, t)) and (x, y) > (z, t), which represents a
contradiction. Thus,

ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(z, t) for all (x, y), (z, t) ∈ R2+ such that (x, y) > (z, t).

(10)

We show now that ϕ is continuous on R2+ . To do so, let {(an , bn )}n be

a sequence in R2+ converging to (a, b) ∈ R2+ . We must show that {αn }n =

{ϕ(an , bn )}n converges to α = ϕ(a, b). Of the three sets: Ω> = {n ∈ N :

αn > α}, Ω< = {n ∈ N : αn < α}, Ω= = {n ∈ N : αn = α}, at least one is

infinite. If Ω= is the only infinite set, then the claim is obviously true. So
suppose this is not the case; let Ω< be infinite. (The proof if Ω> is infinite is
the same.) The claim is true unless Ω< has a limit point α < α. Therefore,
suppose that this were the case. Denote by {αk } a subsequence of Ω< that

converges to α. Consider the curve C(F, i, α+α
). There is a ball, B, about
2
(a, b) ∈ C(F, i, α) which, by the above claim, lies above this curve because

α>

α+α
.
2

But for large k, (aαk , bαk ) ∈ B. This is impossible, since for large k,

all points in C(F, i, αk ) lie below C(F, i, α+α
). Thus, ϕ is continuous on R2+ .
2
This, together with (7), (8), (9) and (10), shows that ϕ ∈ Φ, as desired.
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